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Focusing on the Human Brain Project, I discuss some social and ethical challenges raised by such programs
of research: the possibility of a unified knowledge of ‘‘the brain,’’ balancing privacy and the public good,
dilemmas of ‘‘dual use,’’ brain-computer interfaces, and ‘‘responsible research and innovation’’ in gover-
nance of emerging technologies.What do we know about how the human
brain functions? What more do we need
to know? What might we do with that
knowledge? What would be the social
implications of a greater knowledge of
the brain and the associated increase in
our capacity to intervene in the organ
that somany believe to be the seat of con-
sciousness, cognition, intention, and of
our private selves? What would be the
ethical challenges in gaining that knowl-
edge and in using it? These are some of
the fundamental questions that are being
posed by the large ‘‘brain’’ initiatives that
are underway in a number of regions,
notably the U.S. Brain Research through
Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies
initiative (BRAIN, http://www.nih.gov/
science/brain/), which has a particular
focus on the analysis of neuronal circuits,
and the Human Brain Project (HBP),
funded by the European Union, whose
most high-profile objective is to produce
a simulation of the human brain in a neuro-
morphic supercomputer (https://www.
humanbrainproject.eu/). As a member of
the steering committee of the Social and
Ethical Division of the HBP, with particular
responsibility for its ‘‘Foresight Labora-
tory,’’ these questions are currently
engaging me and my fellow researchers.
A Unified Science of the Brain?
The first of my questions may seem
counterintuitive. Some hundred thousand
peer-reviewed papers in the neurosci-
ences are now published every year.
Surely, we knowmore about the workings
of the human brain than ever before? Isn’t
this what we are told by the dozens of
popular books and media reports on
the human brain? Yet this undoubted1212 Neuron 82, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elseviachievement by the thousands of re-
searchers who now call themselves
neuroscientists—the Society for Neuro-
science currently has over 40,000 mem-
bers in some 90 countries—is also part
of the problem. So many papers, so
many findings, so many research groups,
so many experimental paradigms, so
many different animal models and model
animals—how can we even know what
we know, even with the powerful search
engines and data mining tools that we
nowpossess? Let alone howcanwe bring
this together into a coherent power time
for understanding the functioning of the
brain. Indeed, in Thomas Kuhn’s terms,
we could probably say that neurosci-
ence—despite the single name we’ve
applied to all this research since the
1960s—is still at the ‘‘preparadigmatic’’
stage, in which multiple schools of
thought, multiple theories, hypotheses,
experimental systems, and so forth vie
with one another or coexist relatively inde-
pendently in different locales (Kuhn,
1962). Thus, one of the challenges that
the HBP has set itself is to bring together
and ‘‘integrate’’ these data and findings
in a coherent platform that researchers
can readily interrogate and mine and
that the HBP itself can use in its simula-
tions. The technical difficulties are, of
course, formidable—but so are the con-
ceptual issues. Can any technology really
manage such integration and resolve the
multiple disagreements and differences
of perspective that characterize prepara-
digmatic science? Most scientists long
ago abandoned the quest for a single
‘‘unified’’ science in favor of something
like Nancy Cartwright’s vision of a
‘‘dappled world,’’ in which different scien-er Inc.tific approaches cast different spotlights
on particular domains and problems
(Cartwright, 1999). If scientific knowledge
is always ‘‘perspectival,’’ is a unified
knowledge of ‘‘the brain’’ possible?
Privacy versus the Public Good?
The HBP plans to integrate other data as
well—not just experimental findings but
also clinical data on brain disorders and
psychiatric illnesses—data that usually
lie passively in the clinical records of
many thousands of individuals in hun-
dreds of hospitals and clinics across
Europe—and indeed across the world.
These may include life history data, med-
ical histories, clinical assays, genetic
tests, brain images, records of treatments
and their results and much more. The
scope of such real-world data dwarfs
any clinical trial that can be imagined.
Could one not bring all this together and
mine it for what it can tell us? Indeed
should we not bring all this together,
considering not only that much of these
data were funded directly or indirectly
from tax revenues, but also for its poten-
tial to be used for the public good.
There is a powerful conceptual argu-
ment underpinning this project for feder-
ating and mining huge amounts of clinical
data. The HBP, like the National Institute
for Mental Health, has come to doubt
the utility of current diagnostic categories
when it comes to mental disorders and
indeed to neurodegenerative conditions
(National Institute for Mental Health,
2013). Despite decades of research,
thousands of human hours, millions of
dollars and euros spent, and so many
high hopes and optimistic statements, it
has proved impossible to find clinically
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dition specified in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual or the International
Classification of Diseases; and even the
neurodegenerative disorders lack objec-
tive brain-based markers that can be
used in diagnosis during the patient’s
life. In the light of this impasse, the
HBP—like the NIMH—is taking a different
approach, choosing not to group its
subjects in terms of their clinical classifi-
cations but to seek patterns—brain signa-
tures—in the neurobiological data itself.
Here we find the first big ethical chal-
lenge: that of consent and privacy.
Informed consent for the research use of
one’s medical data has long been the
sine qua non of ethical biomedical
research and the guarantee of its probity.
Today, in the context of heightened fears
about security of digital data, concerns
about data privacy have been raised to a
new level among many regulatory bodies,
including the European Parliament, which
is currently debating a new data protec-
tion law, and among many ethicists. Of
course most patients who have been
treated for psychiatric and neurological
disorders in European hospitals have not
given their informed consent for their re-
cords to be collated and mined in the
way proposed by the HBP. So how can
these data legitimately be used? The
logistical challenge of going back to
each patient for consent would render
the project unmanageable. Without going
into the legal details, and the differences
between full anonymization and pseudoa-
nonymization, anonymization of the data
would solve many of these problems.
But is it possible to process the data so
that the original ‘‘data subject’’—the per-
son to whom it refers—can never be iden-
tified? The HBP has developed an elegant
system for ‘‘federating’’ data, in which
hospitals themselves strip identifying
marks in a way that satisfies their local
and national regulations, and upload it
into locally based servers; these can
then be interrogated remotely by HBP re-
searchers to seek patterns that might be
brain signatures of disorders. The data
never leave the hospital, but concerns
are likely to remain. Some argue that
with a few simple parameters, it is
possible to trace even anonymized data
back to the data subject (on the limits of
deidentification, see Gymrek et al., 2013;Rothstein, 2010). But without some mini-
mal identifiers the data would be of limited
use for researchers, let alone for the
contributing clinicians who, understand-
ably, hope the research might benefit the
treatment of their patients. Should gua-
rantees of privacy triumph over all other
considerations?
Further, even beyond the legal niceties,
what of public trust? One recent example
in the UK generated much concern
despite the trust that most British citizens
place in the National Health Service. The
care.data project aimed to collate elec-
tronic medical data and patient records
held by general practitioners and hospi-
tals in order for it to be mined for medical
research (National Health Service, 2013).
The outcry was not because the project
violated any laws, but on the one hand,
because of anxieties about privacy of
medical information, and on the other,
because the ‘‘data subjects’’ had not
been consulted or even properly informed
of the possible uses of their data. A partic-
ular concern seemed to be the possibility
that the data could be sold to private cor-
porations and exploited for profit rather
than for the public good. A very British
crisis, of course, but it suggests that
open public debate and the active partic-
ipation of ‘‘data subjects’’ may be a better
path to public trust than assurances about
anonymization. Of course, debates about
biobanking have already suggested the
need to rethink conventional ethical prior-
ities of privacy and consent (Lunshof
et al., 2008; Malin et al., 2011). Two rather
basic principles collide: data as personal
property to be protected for the good of
the individual versus data as a potential
public good to be used for the benefit
of fellow citizens—the hundreds and
thousands of them afflicted with brain
diseases.
All in the Brain?
Brain diseases—this phrase also hints at
a further dilemma. We are becoming
accustomed to the proposition—the
hypothesis—that mental disorders and
neurological disorders share so much in
common in terms of neurobiology that
all should be considered diseases of
the brain. Hence it is to the brain, and to
brain research, that we increasingly look
to understand their origins, their causes,
their classification, and the possibleNeuron 8routes and targets for treatment. When
our current symptomatic diagnoses fail
to map onto the brain, when we fail to
find brain-based biomarkers for psychiat-
ric disorders, we question the coherence
and specificity of those diagnostic cate-
gories, those descriptions of the phenom-
enology and subjective experience of the
disorder, at least as far as research on
causes and cures is concerned. Yet, at
the same time, we increasingly recognize
that there are no clear boundaries in these
conditions, that comorbidity is the norm
rather than the exception, that when it
comes to afflictions of the mind, there
are no simple binaries between ill and
well, between normality and pathology.
And while we once placed great hopes
in genomics to help us with the work of
diagnosis and classification, we now
realize that any gene variants associated
with these conditions are pleiotropic and
that similar symptoms can arise from
many different genetic combinations,
usually of small effect and related to rather
basic neurobiological pathways (Hyman,
2010). Further, neuroscience itself has
long recognized that neuronal circuits in
the brain are shaped from the moment
of conception though constant transac-
tions with their milieu—not just the
external world but also the nervous, hor-
monal, and other systems of the body of
which they are a part—at timescales vary-
ing from the millisecond to the decade.
Perhaps, then, to understand the pathol-
ogies of our minds, we need to
understand these vicissitudes of lived
experience, the ways that they get under
the skin, shape gene expression and neu-
ral development, and are embodied in
each individual. Perhaps we need to
step back from our increasing technolog-
ical capacities to explore the brain to
remind ourselves that illness and suffering
are afflictions of human beings in specific
social and cultural conditions (Rose and
Abi-Rached, 2013). That is not just an
ethical challenge but a social and neu-
robiological challenge: to overcome it
requires close collaboration between
neurobiologists and those in the human
and social sciences (Rose, 2013).
This actually takes us right back to the
challenges of the brain, as they are being
addressed by the HBP: the challenges of
complexity and emergence. It is true, of
course, that these terms usually amount2, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 1213
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toward things that we do not know how
to specify, let alone to explain. Yet the
specification and analysis of complexity
and emergence is absolutely crucial
to the kind of understanding of the
brain that is promised by the HBP. The
reductionist experimental strategy that
has dominated neuroscience since the
1960s—the neuromolecular gaze as
Joelle Abi-Rached and I termed it (Abi-
Rached and Rose, 2010)—has produced
great advances in understanding neu-
ronal functioning at this molecular level.
And yet, as a recent contribution to
Neuron also emphasized, we need more
than data to move from an understanding
of single neurons to grasp the collec-
tive action of thousands of neurons
distributed across dynamic and con-
stantly morphing networks, as they work
together across space and time to enable
perception or memory, affect or volition
(Devor et al., 2013). This, of course, is
the ambition of the HBP: to model the
brain, working initially from a precise
specification of the detailed morphology
and characteristics of each cell in each
brain region and working up and through
the levels of complexity using advanced
simulation technologies in order to char-
acterize the functioning of the living
human brain itself. To achieve this would
undoubtedly be a huge scientific and
technical achievement. But can ‘‘mind’’
emerge from matter, mental states from
simulations in silica? And if that scenario,
so beloved of science fiction, were even
partially to be realized, what would be
the ethical implications?
Simulated Minds?
When it comes to the human body, much
that was once mystery is now understood
as manipulable mechanism. Will our brain
projects show that the same is true of
the human mind? Would consciousness
emerge in a simulated brain and if so
what would that imply? What would be
our obligations toward it? If such a
simulated brain, with even rudimen-
tary consciousness, was implanted in
humanoid robots—for example, NAOpro-
duced by Aldebaran Robotics (http://
www.aldebaran.com/en) or Boston Dy-
namics’ PetMan (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=mclbVTIYG8E), which is
now part of the Google empire—how1214 Neuron 82, June 18, 2014 ª2014 Elseviwould we relate to such entities. More
immediately, what are the implications
for brain computer interfaces and the
capacity to link control of robots—of ro-
botic limbs, perhaps robotic drones—
direct to the human brain and its thought
processes? This raises familiar conun-
drums of ‘‘dual use’’—the use for war-
fighting of technical advances initially
intended for medical or civilian use. The
HBP is committed to civil research only,
and all partners have undertaken not to
accept funding from, or use data or
knowledge acquired for, military applica-
tions. But DARPA is a major funder of
the U.S. brain initiative. Yet the HBP is
committed to an open data policy, so
this difference may be less significant
than it seems, for the HBP cannot control
the uses of the knowledge it produces or
the strategies of its commercial partners.
Some medical uses of advancing brain
knowledge may seem relatively uncontro-
versial, but things get more complicated
on further inspection. Thus, develop-
ments in memory modulation to alleviate
disturbing flashback and recollections in
those diagnosed with PTSD may make it
easier for military planners to put their
war fighters in harm’s way. Brain com-
puter interfaces under development seek
to harness brain activity, rather than resid-
ual nerve or muscle function, to control
prosthetic limbs and even to control an
individual’s own limbs that have been
paralyzed by a spinal cord injury. How-
ever, these can facilitate the development
of enhanced warfighters whose own
neurally encoded intentions might be
used to control an exoskeleton that would
not only protect the encased individual—
promoting fearlessness and perhaps
recklessness—but also give them greatly
enhanced sensory capacities and phys-
ical powers. And we are already familiar
with the use of human-controlled drones,
where military personnel manipulate and
target surveillance and weapon-bearing
drones well away from the field of battle
and any direct contact with the conse-
quences of their actions. What, then, of
robotic weapons controlled directly from
the brain?
Other developments also have ‘‘dual
use’’ implications. Despitemany exagger-
ated claims, mind reading in counterter-
rorism—using brain imaging technologies
or noninvasive techniques for monitoringer Inc.electrical activity in the brain—is currently
science fiction. But suppose it did
become possible to use brain imaging
methods to detect specific thoughts or in-
tentions in the human brain—for example,
in those intending to do harm to others
(Bunce et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2004).
In an era suffused by concerns about
risk—prevention, preclusion, precaution,
pre-emption—what role would assess-
ments of neural risk come to play? The
criminal courts have proved competent
at interrogating exaggerated claims con-
cerning the diagnostic and prognostic
capacities of brain images. But one can
imagine neural ‘‘thought detectors’’ being
used in many practices outside the
agonistic environment of the courts—in
the security services, in the military, on
the battlefield, and in civilian life—with
consequences that ignore the multiple
problems of interpretation and reliability
that are inherent in these new technolo-
gies. While ‘‘neural privacy’’ is currently
a rather American concern, these more
general issues of justice and due process
raise some fundamental questions about
rights and regulation.
More immediately, we are already
beginning to see some of the conundrums
that arise in our increasing capacity to
peer into the brains of those who clini-
cians deem to be in persistent vegetative
states or suffering from ‘‘locked in syn-
drome.’’ If we can detect consciousness
in the brains of thosewho clinically appear
nonconscious and unresponsive, what
does this imply for our contemporary
practices of terminal care and for the
hopes and expectations of the families
of those who are in the states? Certainly
our current methods for identifying brain
death, or choosing the moment to with-
draw sustenance and allow a patient to
die, may need to be rethought. And,
without wanting to reduce the ethical
issues arising from such specifically
human dilemmas, what of animals? Sup-
pose we are able to detect the character-
istics of consciousness in our primate
relatives and even in other species?
What then for our carnivorous practices,
let alone our humanistic assumptions
about our special nature?
Mind Control?
What if we move from ‘‘reading’’ the
brain to manipulating the brain? Some
Neuron
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internet—may be familiar with the name
of Jose Delgado, whose research began
when he was so appalled by witnessing
crude interventions into the brain with
lobotomies that he started to explore the
possibility of treating mental illness with
electrical stimulation. Delgado implanted
electrodes in the skulls of over 20 human
subjects in a psychiatric hospital and
showed that electrical stimulation of their
brains could elicit both motor actions
and emotional experiences—fear, rage,
lust, and more—depending on the area
stimulated (Delgado, 1970). He also
carried out extensive research with im-
planted electrodes in animals, showing,
for example, that aggressive animals
could be calmed by stimulation to certain
areas of the brain (Delgado et al., 1968).
His ‘‘stimoceivers’’ could both remotely
monitor the electrical activity of the brain
and be remotely adjusted to stimulate
specific areas of the brain, opening the
possibility of linking information on pat-
terns of neural activity to calculated inter-
ventions to modulate that activity. While
this work became mired in controversy,
and involved invasive implants, new de-
velopments—DBT, TMS, tCDS—are
once more showing that brain activity
can be modulated by noninvasive electri-
cal and magnetic stimulation. No doubt
we are a long way from the ‘‘psychocivi-
lized society’’ envisaged in Delgado’s
controversial book of 1969 (Delgado,
1969), but we should not be surprised in
these emerging technologies for what he
termed ‘‘physical control of the mind,’’
perhaps initially deployed, with consent,
to monitor and control the impulses of
convicted pedophiles as a condition of
release from prison, which raises similar
ethical and social fears and dilemmas.
Responsible Research and
Innovation
These social and ethical dilemmas will be
intensified as the research of the HBP and
the other brain initiatives begins to come
to fruition. The Social and Ethical Division
of the HBP, directed by Jean-Pierre
Changeux and Kathinka Evers, seeks to
ensure that the HBP embodies the princi-
ple of responsible research and innova-
tion, or RRI. At its best, RRI is a processin which anticipations of the potential
impacts of technological advances can
be brought back to the researchers them-
selves to enable them to reflect on the
purposes of motivations and potential
implications of their research, to be
clearer about the associated uncertainties
and assumptions and dilemmas, to open
up these visions to broader deliberation
and dialog among the public, and to use
these to influence the trajectory of the
research and innovation process itself.
We hope to achieve this not only through
the work of our Foresight Lab, but also
by projects that explore the conceptual
and philosophical issues raised by
the HBP, by activities that enhance the
capacity of researchers to analyze the
societal implications of their research,
and by promoting democratic dialog
though an EU Citizen’s Convention and
other events with key stakeholders. We
have also established an independent
ethics committee and other mechanisms
to ensure proper governance of the proj-
ect as a whole. But it is important to
emphasize that RRI is not, as many scien-
tists might fear, a process in which ethi-
cists hold up signs saying, ‘‘danger!,’’
‘‘warning!,’’ ‘‘don’t go there!’’ Given the
human and social toll of psychiatric disor-
ders and neurodegenerative diseases,
given the challenges of assisting those
with brain or spinal cord injuries, perhaps
even in the light of our obligation to make
the best of our everyday cognitive capac-
ities, there are powerful social and ethical
responsibilities to act, not merely to desist
from acting. Responsible research and
innovation aims to ensure that the social
and scientific benefits of research of this
type aremaximized, for history has shown
that the most robust research doesn’t
hide from an engagement with the actual
context of its applications but shows
that it can stand up to challenges in the
real world. To achieve this is no easy
matter. But it is essential if the HBP—
and by extension other brain projects—
is to retain justified public acceptance
and justified public support.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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